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Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of economic conditions in foreign industries on the ﬁling
of antidumping petitions by US industries and the US government’s decision in preliminary
and ﬁnal antidumping investigations. Exploiting cross-country variation in economic shocks in
manufacturing, I estimate a joint model of ﬁling decisions by the US industry and antidumping
decisions by the US government.
I ﬁnd strong evidence that economic weakness in a foreign industry is associated with an
increase in the probability of antidumping protection. After controlling for other political and
economic factors that likely drive industry ﬁling and government decisions including US GDP
growth, I ﬁnd that a one standard deviation fall in the growth of employment (consumption)
in a foreign economy’s manufacturing industry doubles (triples) the joint probability that the
US industry will ﬁle an antidumping petition and the US government will impose a preliminary
(temporary) antidumping measure. The eﬀect of weakness in a foreign economy is even larger for
ﬁnal antidumping measures. A one standard deviation fall in foreign employment (consumption)
growth increases the joint probability that a petition will be ﬁled and a ﬁnal (long-lasting)
antidumping measure will be imposed by a factor of ﬁve (seven). In ﬁnding that US trade
policy is applied counter-cyclically to foreign economic ﬂuctuations, the paper suggests that
trade policy may reduce the extent of business cycle transmission across countries.
JEL Codes: F12, F13
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Under the GATT-WTO system, countries which have negotiated reductions in tariﬀs and other
trade barriers have limited ability to institute new trade barriers. However, the GATT includes
provisions which allow countries to reintroduce trade barriers if speciﬁc economic criteria are met.
Antidumping duties, permitted under the GATT’s agreement on dumping, have become extremely
popular among WTO members around the world (Miranda, Torres and Ruiz, 1998). According to
the GATT, antidumping duties may be imposed if a country’s trading partners are selling products
at “dumped” prices and if there is evidence that the country’s domestic industry is injured by this
dumping.
This paper tests the theory that weak economic conditions in a foreign economy can induce
a particular type of dumping prohibited by the GATT, cyclical dumping or temporarily pricing
below the average total cost of production.2 Models of cyclical dumping (Ethier, 1982; Staiger
and Wolak, 1992; Crowley, 2010) predict that declines in the demand for a product in a foreign
market will lead to increased exports sold at a price in the importing country that is below the
average total cost of production. Using country-speciﬁc information on foreign economic shocks
in manufacturing industries, I estimate a joint model of ﬁling decisions by the US industry and
antidumping decisions by the US government. I ﬁnd that a decline in economic conditions in a
foreign industry has a statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬁling of antidumping
petitions and the government’s decision to impose antidumping measures. After controlling for
other political and economic factors that likely drive industry ﬁling and government decisions,
including US GDP growth, I ﬁnd that a one standard deviation fall in the growth of employment
(consumption) in a foreign economy’s manufacturing industry doubles (triples) the joint probability
that the US industry will ﬁle an antidumping petition and the US government will impose a
preliminary (temporary) antidumping measure. The eﬀect of weakness in a foreign economy is
even larger for ﬁnal antidumping measures. A one standard deviation fall in foreign employment
(consumption) growth increases the joint probability that a petition will be ﬁled and a ﬁnal (long-
lasting) antidumping measure will be imposed by a factor of ﬁve (seven).
Because even temporary, preliminary antidumping measures can have trade-restricting eﬀect, I
estimate models of both preliminary and ﬁnal outcomes. In a binary model of the government’s
2Clarida (1996) presents estimates from a variety of sources that the deﬁnition of dumping as pricing below the
average total cost of production is used in about 2/3 of US antidumping cases.
2preliminary protection decision with industry selection into the antidumping process, the growth
rate of employment in the foreign industry aﬀects the government’s decision to apply a preliminary
antidumping measure. Conditional on an industry ﬁling a request for antidumping protection, a one
standard deviation fall in the growth of industry-level foreign employment in the year prior to the
ﬁling of the petition is associated with a modest increase in the probability of a preliminary measure
of 0.74 percentage points. More importantly, a one standard deviation fall in foreign employment
growth increases the probability of ﬁling (0.23 percentage points) and, thus, more than doubles
the joint probability that a petition will be ﬁled and a preliminary measure will be imposed from
0.14% to 0.32%.
An interesting diﬀerence arises in estimating the role of foreign demand shocks on the govern-
ment’s ﬁnal determination of whether or not to impose a ﬁnal measure jointly with the industry’s
decision to ﬁle a petition. In the ﬁnal decision, which takes place between 235 and 295 days after the
ﬁling of a petition3, the lagged growth of industry-level foreign employment is not a statistically
signiﬁcant determinant of the government’s decision to impose a ﬁnal long-lasting antidumping
measure. However, because foreign economic conditions are a signiﬁcant determinant of industry
ﬁlings, a one standard deviation fall in foreign employment growth dramatically increases the joint
probability of a ﬁling and a ﬁnal measure from 0.09% to 0.52%
This is the ﬁrst paper that I am aware of to show empirically that US trade policy responds
to adverse economic ﬂuctuations in a foreign economy. This paper shares similarities with earlier
work by Knetter and Prusa (2003) on the macro-economic factors underlying antidumping ﬁling
in that both papers exploit inter-temporal variation to identify the relationship between economic
ﬂuctuations and antidumping. Consistent with their ﬁndings and those of Feinberg (2005) and
Jallab, Sandretto, and Gbakou (2006), I ﬁnd that the probability of ﬁling is increasing with an
appreciation of the importing country’s real exchange rate. However, my analysis diﬀers from
Knetter and Prusa (2003) by utilizing country and industry-speciﬁc inter-temporal variation to
explain diﬀerences in ﬁling behavior across accused countries and industries. While Knetter and
Prusa found no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁling rates aggregated across industries
and across accused countries and an aggregate measure of rest-of-world GDP growth over the 3
years prior to ﬁling, my analysis ﬁnds that higher frequency, annual ﬂuctuations in the foreign
3The ﬁnal dumping determination takes place between 235 and 295 days after the ﬁling of a petition in normal
cases, but can be delayed to a time range of 285 to 345 days in special circumstances. The ﬁnal injury decision takes
place 280-340 days after the ﬁling of a petition in normal cases and 330-390 days in special circumstances.
3economy’s industry in the year prior to ﬁling are an important determinant of ﬁling.
Among theoretical models of dumping, the literature has developed into two strands that yield
opposing predictions about the relationship between economic ﬂuctuations in the foreign economy
and the existence of dumping. Beginning with the seminal contribution of Ethier (1982), a number
of papers (Staiger and Wolak, 1992, 1994; Crowley, 2010) model a realization of weak foreign
demand as the driving force behind dumping. In contrast, Clarida (1993) develops a competitive
model of entry and ﬁrm learning about technology to show that dumping can arise during periods
of high worldwide demand. Similarly, Hartigan (1996) builds a duopoly model in which dumping
occurs when foreign demand is high. The contribution of the current paper is that provides empirical
support to models in which weak foreign demand drives dumping.
Previous empirical research on the determinants of antidumping ﬁlings and the outcomes in
investigations has emphasized political factors (Hansen, 1990; Moore, 1992; Hansen and Prusa,
1997), speciﬁc aspects of the legal/bureaucratic institutional framework (Hansen and Prusa, 1996;
Blonigen, 2006), trade policy retaliation (Blonigen and Bown, 20034; Prusa and Skeath, 2002;
Feinberg and Reynolds, 2006) or economic factors (Moore, 1992; Baldwin and Steagall, 1994;
Staiger and Wolak, 1994; and Knetter and Prusa, 2003). The approach here builds on the previous
empirical literature but utilizes a previously unexploited source of variation to identify a relationship
between foreign economic ﬂuctuations and dumping.
Section 2 describes the antidumping process in the United States. Section 3 presents the
empirical model. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section
6 concludes.
2 Antidumping in the United States
This paper attempts to use information on the antidumping process in the United States over
the period 1980-2001 to identify the role that industry-level cyclical economic factors in foreign
economies play in dumping. In the course of an investigation that determines the existence and
4Blonigen and Bown (2003) share a methodological similarity to this paper in that they exploit cross-country
variation in petition ﬁling to identify the eﬀect of the threat of retaliation measured as foreign market size on ﬁling
decisions. Because their analysis utilizes cross-sectional data, they abstract away from the cyclical factors that theory
predicts could explain time-variation in dumping behavior by foreign ﬁrms.
4domestic consequences of dumping, the US government collects and analyzes private business pro-
prietary data on prices and costs of domestic ﬁrms who make accusations of dumping and foreign
ﬁrms accused of dumping. The government also analyzes a variety of publicly available data on
output, imports and domestic employment that inform its decision in antidumping cases. Unfor-
tunately, the econometrician who is interested in testing the theories of cyclical dumping cannot
observe the business proprietary data on prices and costs that the government observes.
Nevertheless, I can observe industry and government decisions at several stages in the antidump-
ing process. Furthermore, I have several measures that can proxy for the strength of demand in
a foreign country’s industry. The growth of employment and the growth of consumption in the
foreign country should all be highly correlated with the strength of demand in industry i in coun-
try j. According to cyclical dumping models, weakness in any of these variables in industry i,
country j in year t induces (1) pricing below average total cost and (2) injury to the domestic
import-competing industry (i.e., increased imports, lower domestic market share, lower domestic
capacity utilization). Because weakness in foreign demand precipitates conditions that satisfy the
legal deﬁnition of dumping, it should be associated with an increase in the probability of a petition
by the domestic industry and an increase in the probability of protection.
Figure 1 presents, by antidumping petition status, the mean growth of foreign industry-level
employment in the year before an antidumping petition is ﬁled. This is the mean growth rate over
28 3 digit ISIC manufacturing industries for 49 countries between 1980-2001.5 Figure 2 presents
the mean growth of foreign industry-level consumption in the year prior to a ﬁling. Beginning with
ﬁgure 1, it appears that negative employment growth in a foreign industry is correlated with an
antidumping case being ﬁled and is also correlated with the imposition of a preliminary antidumping
duty. Figure 2 shows that cases tend to be ﬁled and preliminary duties tend to be imposed against
foreign industries whose consumption growth is relatively weak. Somewhat surprisingly, the pattern
appears reversed for ﬁnal antidumping duties. In brief, this simple ﬁgure suggests that foreign
economic conditions are relevant to antidumping protection. The empirical strategy in this paper
is to use cross-industry cross-country and inter-temporal variation in antidumping decisions to
identify if antidumping protection is induced by weak foreign demand and, if so, to quantify the
increase in the probability of protection associated with economic weakness in foreign countries.
Identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of foreign demand strength on ﬁlings and outcomes comes from three
sources of variation in the domestic-industry-foreign-country-year (ijt) panel data. First, within an
5The data used in these graphs are described in detail in section 4.
5industry i in year t, there is variation across countries j both in whether or not they are included
in an antidumping petition and in the government’s determination of injury and dumping. Second,
within a year t, there is variation across industries i in ﬁling and protection decisions. Finally, there
is intertemporal variation for industry i and country j in the timing of petition-ﬁling by industries
and the protection decisions by governments.
The US antidumping process can be broken into three distinct phases, each with its own data
requirements: 1. initiation of a case, 2. a preliminary phase with a determination as to whether
or not dumped imports are causing or threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry and a
preliminary determination about the existence and magnitude of dumping, and 3. a ﬁnal phase with
determination about the existence and magnitude of dumping and a ﬁnal injury determination. 6
In the ﬁrst step, a domestic industry i that produces a product (also denoted i7) must initiate
or ﬁle a petition with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) and the US International Trade
Commission (USITC) that claims that the industry is being materially injured or threatened with
materially injury by reason of imports of good i at a price that is “less than fair value” from a single
country j or multiple countries j = 1,2,3.... Thus, the ﬁrst margin of cross-country within-industry
and within-year variation comes in the ﬁling decision.8
Table 1 presents the frequency of ﬁling a petition in industry i against country j in year t for the
272,639 industry-country-year observations in the unbalanced panel of 439 industries, 49 countries
and 22 years used in this paper. The ﬁrst important observation is that antidumping petitions are
6A detailed description of the current antidumping process and a brief history of the evolution of US antidumping
law since 1916 can be found in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook published by the US International
Trade Commission (2007). Although US trade law has been revised a number of times since the start of my data
sample in 1980, the antidumping process is largely unchanged with one important exception. Beginning in 1984, the
rule to cumulate imports from all countries listed in a petition during the injury investigation led to super-additivity
in USITC decisions and a 20-30% increase in the probability of protection (Hansen and Prusa, 1996). However, as
Hansen and Prusa (1996) note, “the ITC always makes its decisions on a country-by-country basis, even if imports
from a set of countries are cumulated.”
7In practice, the deﬁnition of the domestic “like product” is part of the investigation process. In general, the
USITC deﬁnition of the “like product” is only a subset of the output of the 4 digit SIC 1987 industries that are the
most ﬁnely disaggregated units available for a cross-sectional analysis in the US.
8Prusa (1997) and Benton (2001) exploit this variation to show that the country-speciﬁcity of antidumping protec-
tion leads to increased imports into the US (Prusa) and EU (Benton) from countries that are not speciﬁcally targeted
by the antidumping measure.
6a rare event. The row “Country j exports i to the US at t and is accused of dumping” indicates
that the frequency of dumping accusations in the sample is less than 0.2% (545/272639). Second,
the row “Country j exports i to the US at t and is not accused” captures the high degree of cross-
country variation in petition ﬁling. There are 8017 observations in the dataset in which a country
j with positive exports to the US in industry i year t was not listed in a antidumping petition ﬁled
by the domestic US industry i in year t. Thus, while only 545 petitions were ﬁled in the unbalanced
manufacturing panel, an additional 8017 petitions would have been ﬁled if the domestic industry
had indiscriminately listed every country j that exported industry i’s output to the US in year t.
It thus appears that domestic industries are somewhat selective in their accusations of dumping.9
This selectivity is likely inﬂuenced by the economic and ﬁnancial data which are included in
an industry’s antidumping petition. In addition to data on the domestic industry itself (capacity,
production, domestic sales, export sales, inventories, the number of production and non-supervisory
workers, and income and loss data), a petition must include data on the foreign ﬁrms and countries
accused of dumping. First, it must include the quantity and value of “less-than-fair-value” imports
from each supplying country for the most recent 3 years. Second, it must include data directly
related to the determination of dumping; i.e., the price charged by foreign ﬁrms in the US for
the “dumped” product and the domestic ﬁrms’ price for the same product for the most recent 5
quarters.10
If a petition contains all the necessary information, the preliminary phase of the investigation
begins. During the preliminary phase, the US International Trade Commission makes a prelimi-
nary determination of injury and/or threat of injury due to dumped imports for each country j
listed in the petition. In making its decision, the USITC relies on information obtained through
questionnaires sent to domestic producers, importers and foreign producers.11 If the preliminary
injury determination by the USITC is negative, the case ends with no antidumping duty. If the
preliminary injury determination is aﬃrmative, then the case proceeds to the US Department of
9Blonigen and Bown (2003) explain this selectivity as partially due to a US industry’s fear of foreign retaliation.
10The International Trade Administration Form ITA-357P (OMB Control # 0625-0105) provides a detailed guide-
line of the price and cost information that must be included in a petition for antidumping protection.
11Domestic producers’ questionnaires request economic data on capacity, production, inventories, commercial ship-
ments, export shipments, internal consumption, company transfers, employment, hours worked, wages, as well as
ﬁnancial data on income, losses, capital expenditures and sales prices. Importer questionnaires request data on the
quantity and value of imports and sales prices. Finally, foreign producers’ questionnaires inquire about the ﬁrm’s
capacity, production, home-market shipments, exports, and inventories.
7Commerce for a preliminary dumping determination.12
During the second part of the preliminary phase, the US Department of Commerce makes a
preliminary determination of dumping against each country j listed in a petition.13 The dumping
margin for country j is calculated as the diﬀerence in the price charged by country j producers in
the US and country j,the US and a third market, or the diﬀerence between the price charged in
the US price and the average total cost of production of a ﬁrm in country j. Preliminary dumping
margins vary considerably across countries listed within a petition, with the USDOC occasionally
ﬁnding that there is no evidence of dumping by some countries that have been found guilty of
causing injury.14
To summarize the preliminary phase, a preliminary antidumping measure is imposed if both the
USITC and the USDOC come to aﬃrmative preliminary determinations. Cross-country variation
in the application of a preliminary antidumping duty within a case can arise from cross-country
variation in the injury decision or in the dumping determination. Interestingly, when petitions
against individual countries are clustered into multicountry cases, we observe that roughly 73% of
multi-country cases have outcomes in which all countries were found guilty of dumping and injury
or no countries were found guilty of both dumping and injury. In the other 26% of cases, at least
one country had a preliminary outcome that diﬀered from that of the other countries accused in
the multi-country case.
Table 2 provides evidence of this cross-country variation in preliminary outcomes for antidump-
ing cases ﬁled by US manufacturing industries between 1980 and 2001. The preliminary outcome is
deﬁned as aﬃrmative if the US ITC ﬁnds preliminary evidence of injury or threat of injury and the
USDOC ﬁnds preliminary evidence of dumping. The preliminary outcome is deﬁned as negative if
either agency makes a negative determination. The ﬁrst column reports the number of countries
12Although it is uncommon, the USITC occasionally splits its preliminary decision across countries. For example,
in the 1993 case of phthalic anhydride (731-TA-664-668), only one of the ﬁve countries accused of dumping was found
to be injuring the domestic US industry during the preliminary investigation. Similarly, in the 1995 case of polyvinyl
alcohol (731-TA-726-729), only three of the four countries accused of dumping were found to be a cause of injury
during the preliminary investigation.
13This determination is made within 115 days of the USITC’s preliminary determination. Therefore, the total
elapsed time from initiation to a preliminary measure is 160 days in normal cases.
14See, for example, the splits in preliminary dumping determinations in oil country tubular goods in 1994 (731-
TA-711-717), stainless steel round wire in 1997 (731-TA-781-786), low enriched uranium in 2000 (731-TA-909-912),
and structural steel beams in 2001 (731-TA-935-942).
8named in an antidumping case, the second column lists the number of multicountry-cases, the third
column lists the number cases in which all the accused countries faced a preliminary antidumping
measure, and column 4 lists the number of multicountry cases in which no accused country faced
a preliminary antidumping measure. Column 5 reports the number of cases in which some accused
countries faced preliminary measures and some did not. Overall, in about 26% of antidumping
cases at least one country had a preliminary outcome that was diﬀerent from its accused peers.
If the preliminary injury investigation found evidence of injury caused by “dumped” imports,
the case proceeds to the ﬁnal phase. In the ﬁnal phase, the USITC again sends questionnaires
to the domestic ﬁrms, importers, and foreign ﬁrms that reported production and/or imports dur-
ing the preliminary phase. Final questionnaires request generally the same data as preliminary
questionnaires, but are updated with more recent data. One diﬀerence with the preliminary inves-
tigation is that questionnaires are sent to purchasers of the product requesting data on the value of
purchases of the product manufactured domestically, by foreign ﬁrms accused of dumping and by
other foreign ﬁrms. Purchasers are also asked to compare foreign and domestic products in terms
of price, quality, service, delivery, etc. The US Department of Commerce makes a ﬁnal dumping
determination according to the price and cost data available. As in the preliminary phase, there is
considerable variation across countries in the magnitude of the ﬁnal duty with Commerce ﬁnding no
evidence of dumping in some cases. Diﬀerences in the magnitudes of preliminary and ﬁnal dumping
margins can arise because more recent data on prices and costs have become available or because
data obtained in the ﬁnal questionnaires may obtain revisions to data obtained in the preliminary
questionnaire.
To conclude the ﬁnal phase of the investigation, the US ITC makes a ﬁnal injury determina-
tion.15 The USITC generally groups all countries j that have proceeded to the ﬁnal phase together
in its injury decision, but split decisions are possible if some countries are being investigated for
a threat of injury (as opposed to actual injury). If there is evidence of injury and dumping, the
government imposes a ﬁnal antidumping duty.16 In summary, during the ﬁnal phase of an inves-
15This determination is made within 120 days of the US DOC’s preliminary dumping determination or 45 days of
its ﬁnal dumping determination, whichever date is later. Consequently, the total elapsed time from initiation of a
petition to the ﬁnal determination can range from 280 to 340 days in normal cases.
16See Blonigen and Haynes (2002) and Blonigen and Park (2004) for a detailed discussion of the dynamics of
antidumping duties after imposition. Since 1995, GATT rules limit the duration of antidumping measures to 5 years.
However, Cadot, de Melo, and Tumurchudur (2007) ﬁnd that US compliance with the WTO’s sunset review policy
is weak at best and likely has had no impact on the duration of US antidumping duties.
9tigation, cross-country variation in which countries ultimately face antidumping duties can arise
from variation in the outcome of the dumping determination or the injury (or threat of injury)
determination.
Table 3 presents evidence on the cross-country variation in ﬁnal determinations for antidumping
cases brought by US manufacturers between 1980 and 2001. The structure of the table is the same
as table 2. Again we observe that in the ﬁnal stage of an antidumping investigation, the government
split its decision across countries accused of dumping in one quarter of multi-country cases.
3 Empirical Model
To evaluate if foreign economic ﬂuctuations lead to cyclical dumping, I estimate a binary model
with selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981)), speciﬁcally, a binary model of industry i
petitions for antidumping protection against countries j and a binary model of the government’s
decision to impose antidumping measures. The empirical model is a two stage process. In the ﬁrst
stage, in every period t an industry i makes a binary decision to ﬁle for protection or not to ﬁle
against each foreign country j that exports i’s product to the US. In the second stage, if an industry
has ﬁled for protection, the government makes a binary decision of whether or not to impose an
antidumping measure against each country j accused of dumping.
To simplify the analysis, in the second stage, I estimate a binary model of the government’s
decision to impose a preliminary antidumping measure in which the injury determination by the
USITC and the dumping determination by the USDOC are collapsed into a single outcome variable
which is aﬃrmative if both agency decisions are aﬃrmative. Similarly, the binary model of the ﬁnal
decision is collapsed into a single outcome variable which is aﬃrmative if there is evidence of both
dumping and injury.
In the second stage, the government’s latent measure of injury and dumping d∗
ijt is unobserved,
but takes the form d∗
ijt = β′xijt + εijt where i denotes the industry in which dumping is alleged to
occur, j denotes the foreign country accused of dumping, and t denotes the time period in which
the complaint is ﬁled. The variables in xijt are described in detail in the next section. In brief,
this vector includes a measure of the state of industry demand in both the accused foreign country
and in the importing country and lagged measures of injury to the importing country’s industry.
Although I do not observe the latent measure of injury and dumping, I observe the importing
10government’s decision of whether (dijt = 1) or not (dijt = 0) to impose antidumping protection






















where the CDF for a normal distribution is denoted by Φ.
An antidumping case is only considered by the government if a domestic industry chooses to
ﬁle a petition for protection. If an industry’s decision to apply for protection and the government’s
decision to grant protection are correlated, then estimates of β will be inconsistent.
In the ﬁrst stage, the industry’s latent measure of selection, y∗
ijt, is unobserved, but takes the
form y∗
ijt = γ′zijt+νijt, where zijt is a vector that includes a measure of the state of industry demand
in the foreign country and foreign and domestic industry characteristics that are predetermined at

























Given the preceding assumptions, the expectation of the government’s latent variable in the
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11and the government’s latent variable is given by:
d∗
ijt = β′xijt + ρ
φ(−γ′zijt)
Φ(γ′zijt)
+ ˜ εijt (5)
where ˜ εijt is normally distributed and independent of νijt, E(˜ εijt
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0) = 1 − ρ2λijt(−γ′zijt − λijt) and where λijt = φ(−γ′zijt)/Φ(γ′zijt).
Renormalizing d∗
ijt so that the variance of the censored error, ˜ εijt, is equal to one allows us to
















Identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of foreign demand strength on ﬁlings and outcomes comes from three
sources of variation in the ijt panel data. First, within an industry i in year t, there is variation
across countries j both in whether or not they are included in an antidumping petition and in
the government’s determination of injury and dumping. Second, within a year t, there is variation
across industries i in ﬁling and protection decisions. Finally, there is intertemporal variation for
industry i and country j in the timing of petition-ﬁling by industries and the protection decisions
by governments.
Marginal eﬀects and predicted joint probabilities derived from coeﬃcient estimates obtained
from maximizing the log of the likelihood (6) are reported in tables 6 - 11.
4 Data
I estimate the empirical model using a panel dataset constructed from three main data sources:
(1) the World Bank’s Trade, Production and Protection Data, (2) the NBER Trade and Manufac-
turing Databases, and (3) the Global Antidumping Database maintained by Chad Bown. Data on
US GDP growth come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Annual bilateral real exchange
rates in foreign currency per US dollar come from the USDA Economic Research Service. Summary
statistics for all variables in the dataset are reported in table 5.
The focus of the empirical work is quantifying the role that foreign demand shocks play in
industry petitioning and the government’s decision to impose antidumping protection. The World
12Bank’s Trade, Production and Protection Data compiled by Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olar-
reaga provides information on output, imports, exports and employment for 28 3 digit ISIC Rev.
2 manufacturing industries from 1980-2001 for 49 developed and developing economies.17 Because
US antidumping duties are imposed against countries and not customs unions or free trade areas,
the analysis treats each country of the EU as a separate observation with country-level, rather than
Union-level data used in the analysis.
Estimation of the model uses four diﬀerent proxies for the strength of demand in country
j industry i: the growth of employment for ijt − 1, the growth of consumption (output plus
imports less exports) for ijt−1, detrended employment growth and detrended consumption growth.
Although foreign consumption growth would seem to be the best measure to capture ﬂuctuations in
foreign demand, the rationale for focusing on foreign employment growth is that we might expect
the reported counts of workers to be a relatively high quality variable across a wide spectrum
of countries. Moreover, data on industry employment is available for more countries and years.
The two detrended growth measures are intended to better capture country and industry-speciﬁc
demand ﬂuctuations. The detrended variable is deﬁned as employment (consumption) growth in
country j industry i at t − 1 less the average annual growth rate of employment for country j
industry i from 1979 (or earliest year available) until 2001. The logged levels of employment and
consumption serve as proxies for the size of the foreign industry. Because the current value of these
variables could be endogenous to ﬁling behavior by US industries, I use the ﬁrst lag of all foreign
variables in estimating the model.
The NBER Trade and Manufacturing Databases provide data on imports, shipments, prices,
employment, real capital stock and value added for about 450 manufacturing industries. These
data were concorded to 439 1987 4 digit SIC codes using the industry concordance provided by the
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and the original data from 1979-1994 were extended
through 2001. Nominal values of imports and shipments (a measure of domestic output) were
17Countries in the dataset include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. Twenty-two years of disaggregated manufacturing data
are available for almost all of the countries in the dataset. Important targets of US antidumping duties with fewer
than twenty-two years of available data include: the People’s Republic of China (1980-1998), Germany (1992-2001),
and Brazil (1993-1996).
13deﬂated to real 1987 dollars using industry speciﬁc price indices.
Industry characteristics used to estimate the selection equation include political and economic
measures that may aﬀect an industry’s propensity to ﬁle but are thought to be unrelated to the
government’s determination of dumping. Some industries may be more likely to ﬁle for protection
than others. For example, large industries may be better able to assume the large legal ﬁxed cost of
ﬁling a petition. Industries in which the level of imports relative to total domestic consumption is
high may be more familiar with trade protection policies and thus, more likely to ﬁle. The vertical
structure of an industry may matter; industries that are further downstream may ﬁle more petitions
because they are more sensitive to industry price changes. Thus, a measure of industry size, the
level of employment; the real import penetration ratio (real imports/(real imports + real domestic
shipments)); and a proxy for the vertical structure of an industry, the value-added to output ratio
are used to estimate the selection equation. The selection equation also includes three measures
of injury which US law suggests should be important to the government’s decision; the capacity
utilization rate (real shipments/real capital stock), the percent change in the import penetration
ratio and the change in employment. Because the current values of industry speciﬁc variables and
the choice of whether to petition for protection may be endogenous, I use lagged values of these
variables in zijt.
Data on antidumping cases from 1979 through 2001 come from Global Antidumping Database
Version 3.0 compiled by Chad Bown at Brandeis University. The US ﬁles in the database provide
detailed information on the date a petition was ﬁled, the identity of the country accused of dump-
ing, tariﬀ line information on the products involved, various outcome dates, and the outcomes at
diﬀerent stages of the investigation. The variable on petition ﬁlings takes on a value of one if the
US industry ﬁled a petition. Using the detailed information on the case outcome, I construct two
binary measures of the government’s determination: preliminary decision and ﬁnal decision. Fol-
lowing Hansen and Prusa (1995), the preliminary (ﬁnal) decision is coded as aﬃrmative if the US
government imposed a preliminary (ﬁnal) antidumping duty or if he case resulted in a suspension
or termination agreement during the preliminary (ﬁnal) phase.18
18As a robustness check, I have re-estimated the basic speciﬁcations for preliminary duties and ﬁnal duties after
re-coding suspension and termination agreements as negative (no-duty) outcomes. The estimated marginal eﬀects of
foreign economic conditions are similar across coding schema although the magnitudes are larger when suspensions
and terminations are coded as no-duty outcomes. The robustness across coding schema is likely due to the rarity of
suspensions and terminations after the late 1980s.
14The three datasets used in the paper provide information on industries at three diﬀerent levels
of aggregation: 3 digit foreign industries, 4 digit US industries, and 5, 7, 8, or 10 digit antidumping
cases. In order to merge these three datasets together, the 439 4 digit SIC87 manufacturing
industries were mapped into 28 ISIC R. 2 manufacturing industries by the author. Similarly,
the tariﬀ-line level antidumping case data were also mapped into 439 4 digit SIC87 industries by
the author. Because the US and foreign industry data used in the analysis are more aggregated
than the industries investigated in antidumping cases, we might expect parameter estimates based
on these aggregated variables to underestimate the true eﬀect of domestic and foreign factors on
antidumping outcomes.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical results summarized in tables 8 and 11 indicate that a weakening of demand
in a foreign industry is associated with an increased probability of US antidumping protection.
According to the estimates of the empirical model, a one standard deviation fall in foreign demand
increases the joint probability that a US industry will seek and the US government will grant
a preliminary antidumping measure by a factor of two to three, depending on the measure of
foreign demand used. Similarly, a one standard deviation fall in foreign demand increases the joint
probability of a ﬁling and a ﬁnal antidumping measure by a factor of ﬁve to seven, depending upon
the precise measure. This suggests that the US government might be using antidumping protection
to shelter the US economy from cyclical dumping caused by economic weakness in a foreign trading
partner.
Tables 6 and 7 report the estimated marginal eﬀects on the probability that an industry i
will ﬁle an antidumping petition against country j in year t and in the probability that the US
government will impose a preliminary antidumping measure. The predicted joint probability of a
petition ﬁling and a preliminary antidumping measure associated with a one standard deviation
fall in foreign demand is presented in table 8.
Tables 9 and 10 present estimated marginal eﬀects for petition ﬁlings and ﬁnal antidumping
measures. Table 11 summarizes these results as the predicted joint probability of a petition ﬁling
and a ﬁnal antidumping measure in response to a one standard deviation fall in foreign demand.
155.1 Preliminary antidumping measures
Table 6 presents estimates of the two-stage model of the US industry’s ﬁling decision and
government’s decision to impose a preliminary antidumping measure. The top panel of table 6
reports the marginal increase in the probability that a US industry will ﬁle an antidumping petition
associated with changes in measures of foreign demand and the size of the foreign industry. The
bottom panel reports the marginal increase in the probability of the US government imposing a
preliminary antidumping measure.
Column 1 reports results for the basic speciﬁcation. A one unit increase in the lagged growth of
foreign employment is associated with a 1.2% decrease in the probability that a domestic industry
will ﬁle an antidumping petition. Evaluated at the sample mean, a one standard deviation fall in
lagged foreign employment growth increases the probability that that country’s industry will face
an antidumping petition by 0.23 percentage points. This roughly doubles the probability of a ﬁling
relative to the unconditional mean ﬁling rate in the sample of 0.20%.
Proceeding to the lower panel of the table, in column 1 a one-unit increase in the growth of
foreign employment is associated with a reduction in the probability of an preliminary antidumping
measure of 3.8% after controlling for other factors (the lagged employment of the foreign industry,
the lagged growth of country-speciﬁc import penetration, lagged US GDP growth, and the lagged
bilateral exchange rate) and the domestic industry’s ﬁrst-stage decision to ﬁle an antidumping pe-
tition. The economic signiﬁcance is moderate; a one standard deviation fall in foreign employment
growth translates into a 0.74 percentage point increase in the probability of an aﬃrmative prelimi-
nary decision. Combining estimates from the two stages of the model, the predicted joint probability
of a petition ﬁling and a preliminary measure being imposed associated with a one standard devia-
tion fall in lagged foreign employment growth is 0.32%, roughly 2 times the mean joint probability
in the sample of 0.14%. Table 8 reports predicted joint probabilities for all speciﬁcations.
Moving across the columns of table 6, alternative measures of the strength of foreign demand are
employed. Column 2 substitutes the lagged growth of foreign consumption for the lagged growth
of employment. The results for the main variable of interest are of the same sign and similar
magnitude in the industry ﬁling equation, even though the sample size is reduced by roughly
50,000 observations when this less-available measure of foreign demand is used. On this smaller
sample, the coeﬃcient on lagged foreign consumption growth is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
in the government’s decision equation. Table 8 reports that the predicted joint probability of a
16petition and a preliminary measure is 0.44% in response to a one standard deviation fall in lagged
foreign consumption growth.
This raises a question: are the diﬀerences in the estimates presented in columns 1 and 2 due to
diﬀerences in the measures of foreign demand or due to diﬀerences in the estimation samples. The
results in column 3 attempt to resolve this. Column 3 repeats the speciﬁcation 1 on the smaller
sample of observations for which the lagged foreign consumption growth variable is available. On
this smaller sample, the marginal eﬀect of a change in foreign employment growth is larger in the
industry’s ﬁling equation, and not signiﬁcant in the government’s decision equation. To assess the
quantitative signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences, table 8 reports that the predicted joint probability
of a petition and a preliminary measure conditional on a one standard deviation fall in the two
measures of foreign demand. For both speciﬁcations 2 and 3, the joint probability is 0.44%. This
suggests that the diﬀerences in estimates across speciﬁcations are likely due to the changing sample
size rather than in a fundamental diﬀerence in what the variables are measuring.
In speciﬁcation 4, the measure of foreign demand is the actual growth of foreign employment
in the year before the antidumping petition was ﬁled less the long-run trend growth of foreign
employment in country j’s industry i. This detrended measure of foreign employment growth might
better capture the country and industry-speciﬁc cyclicality of foreign demand. The results are close
in magnitude to those of the basic speciﬁcation. In table 8 the predicted joint probability of an
antidumping measure for this speciﬁcation is 0.29%, a hair smaller than the predicted probability
from speciﬁcation 1 of 0.32%. Speciﬁcation 5 repeats this type of analysis by using detrended foreign
consumption growth. Again, the estimates are quantitatively similar in size with a predicted joint
probability of 0.39% compared to 0.44% from speciﬁcation 2. Together, columns 4 and 5 indicate
that the results are robust to diﬀerent measures of foreign demand that might better capture
country and industry speciﬁc cycles.19
19The coeﬃcient estimates of US variables that are not reported (the growth of lagged import penetration, the
lagged level of import penetration, the lagged growth of employment in the domestic industry, the lagged level of
domestic employment, the lagged level of capacity utilization, the lagged growth of US GDP, and the lagged level of the
bilateral real exchange rate) are generally in line with previous research and are available upon request. Interestingly,
coeﬃcient estimates on the lagged import penetration ratio and the lagged growth of import penetration in the
selection equation tell us that (1) consistent with Staiger and Wolak’s (1994) ﬁndings, industries with higher import
penetration ratios are more likely to seek protection and further, (2) countries with higher import penetration ratios
are more likely to be targets of antidumping activity than countries with lower import penetration ratios. However,
a shortcoming of the import penetration variable is that it cannot inform us as to whether industries seek (and the
17The second to last line of table 6 reports estimates of ρ, the correlation of the errors from the ﬁrst
and second stage. Estimates of ρ in table 6 are negative and of roughly the same magnitude across
all speciﬁcations. A negative selection bias is somewhat surprising. One possible interpretation
is that US industries only apply for protection if they are in poor health and think that they
might reasonably satisfy the injury criteria. Among this set of poorly-performing industries, the
government chooses to protect only the relatively healthy industries with an antidumping measure.
The last row of table 6 reports the loglikelihood. Because the inclusion of diﬀerent variables
changes the estimation sample, it is not feasible to use the loglikelihood to compare ﬁt across all
models. However, comparisons can be made between speciﬁcations 2 and 3, 1 and 4, and 3 and 5.
The diﬀerences in model ﬁt, as shown by the loglikelihoods, are small.
Table 7 presents variations of the basic speciﬁcation. In speciﬁcation 6, the panel dataset is
restricted to the 4 digit SIC87 industries that have ﬁled at least one antidumping petition against
any country j between 1980 and 2001. This speciﬁcation relies heavily on time series variation
for frequent industry users of antidummping to obtain identiﬁcation. In table 8, a one standard
deviation fall in foreign employment growth generates a predicted joint probability of a preliminary
antidumping measure of 0.64%, suggesting that cyclical variation in the foreign economy might
be even more important in industries that regularly seek antidumping protection. Speciﬁcation 7
attempts to control for the fact that small exporters are not subject to antidumping duties.20 This
sample drops all country-product-year observations in which a country’s share of the US import
market is less than 1% of a 4 digit SIC87 industry. After omitting these smaller exporters, the joint
probability of a preliminary antidumping measure is 0.92% conditional on a one standard deviation
US government imposes) antidumping protection because US shipments have fallen or because foreign imports have
risen. Thus, the ﬁnding that antidumping protection is more likely against a country that is experiencing relatively
weak growth in its own industry after controlling for import penetration informs our understanding of why there is
variation in the government’s policy response to two diﬀerent countries or industries with similar levels of import
penetration. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Knetter and Prusa (2003), Feinberg (2005) and Jallab, Sandretto and
Gbakou (2006) all of whom estimate negative binomial models of ﬁling rates, a real appreciation of the dollar is
associated with an increase in the probability of antidumping ﬁlings.
20The WTO’s antidumping code states that any country which is the source of less than 3% of the imports of a
product that is subject to an antidumping investigation is a “negligible” supplier and cannot be subject to antidumping
duties. Because my analysis uses industry deﬁnitions at the 4 digit SIC87 level which are more aggregated than the
product deﬁnitions used in antidumping cases, I restrict the “large exporter” sample to countries with an import
market share greater than 1% of the 4 digit industry. Results are robust to modest changes in this deﬁnition.
18fall in foreign industry employment growth. This is more than twice as large as the joint probability
of a ﬁling and preliminary measure in this “large exporter” sample of 0.44%. Finally, speciﬁcation
8 seeks to identify if antidumping investigations that involve more than one country are more or
less likely to face a preliminary antidumping duty that single-country investigations. The estimate
on the multicountry case dummy is not statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that multicountry cases
are not more likely to result in preliminary antidumping measures than single country cases after
controlling for other factors. The marginal eﬀect of a foreign demand shock has the same sign and
a slightly larger magnitude in both stages of the non-linear model. The predicted joint probability
of 0.41% is slightly larger than for the basic speciﬁcation. Overall, table 7 validates the robustness
of the basic results while suggesting that the magnitude of foreign economic shocks is likely larger
for industries that regularly seek protection under antidumping law and for important exporting
countries.
In summary, weak growth in either employment or consumption in foreign industries is a pow-
erful predictor of a preliminary antidumping measure. After controlling for other economic and
political factors including US GDP growth, a one standard deviation fall in the lagged growth of
foreign demand increases the probability of a preliminary antidumping measure by a factor of 2 to
3, depending on the precise measure of foreign demand used. In conclusion, temporary US trade
policies are applied counter-cyclically to foreign economic ﬂuctuations.
5.2 Final antidumping measures
Table 9 presents marginal eﬀects for the model of industry ﬁling and the government’s decision to
impose ﬁnal antidumping measures. A one standard deviation fall in foreign employment growth has
a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the probability that a petition will be ﬁled, but is not a statistically
signiﬁcant determinant of the government’s decision to impose ﬁnal (long-lasting) antidumping
measures. Quantitatively, the predicted joint probability of a petition and a ﬁnal antidumping
measure evaluated at the sample mean is 0.52% in response to a one standard deviation fall in foreign
employment growth. This is a more than ﬁve-fold increase above the underlying joint probability
in the sample of 0.09%. See table 11. Substituting in foreign consumption growth (speciﬁcation
10), using a smaller sample (speciﬁcation 11), or using detrended employment (speciﬁcation 12) or
consumption growth (speciﬁcation 13) as the measure of foreign demand generate broadly consistent
results. The strength of foreign demand is an important determinant of ﬁling behavior, but not of
the government’s decision. In table 11, the predicted joint probabilities of a petition and a ﬁnal
19measure are 0.69%, 0.56%, 0.48% and 0.49% for speciﬁcations 10-13, respectively.21
It is not clear why the measures of foreign demand are not signiﬁcant determinants in the
government’s ﬁnal decision. One possibility is that new data might become available to policy
makers between the time of the preliminary and ﬁnal decision. However, because the overwhelming
majority of preliminary and ﬁnal decisions are made within the same calendar year, there is not
enough variation in the sample to examine this with annual data.22
Table 10 reports three addition speciﬁcations. Column 14 presents estimates obtained from a
sample restricted to 4 digit SIC87 industries that ﬁled at least one antidumping petition during the
sample period. Again, the sign of the marginal eﬀect of foreign employment growth is the same as
that of the basic speciﬁcation 9 reported in table 9. Quantitatively, table 11 reports a one standard
deviation fall in lagged foreign employment growth increases the joint probability of a ﬁling and a
ﬁnal measure to 0.71%. Speciﬁcation 15 restricts the sample to large exporters as deﬁned above.
Within this sample of large exporters, a one standard deviation fall in lagged foreign employment
growth increases the joint probability of a ﬁling and a ﬁnal measure to 0.45% from a mean in this
sample of 0.27%. Speciﬁcation 16 adds a multicountry case dummy to the government’s decision
rule and yields an estimate of the joint probability of a ﬁling and a ﬁnal measure associated with
a one standard deviation fall in lagged foreign employment growth of 0.55%.
To summarize tables 9 and 10, economic weakness in foreign industries is a strong predictor of
ﬁnal antidumping measures. However, the mechanism by which these variables inﬂuence the out-
come is diﬀerent for ﬁnal (long-lasting) antidumping duties and preliminary (temporary) measures.
While measures of economic weakness in a foreign industry directly impact both the government’s
preliminary antidumping decision rule and the domestic industry’s ﬁling rule, for ﬁnal antidumping
duties, measures of foreign demand only aﬀect the ultimate outcome through the domestic indus-
try’s ﬁling decision. Depending on the exact speciﬁcation of the model, a one standard deviation
fall in foreign demand can increase by a factor of 10 the joint probability that an industry will ﬁle
an antidumping petition and the US government will impose a ﬁnal antidumping duty.
21As with preliminary measures, the coeﬃcient estimates for other variables are generally in line with previous
research. The estimated correlation coeﬃcient is negative in all speciﬁcations.
22Estimating the model with the data lagged from the date of the ﬁnal decision rather than the petition ﬁling
yielded no notable changes. Because most cases are completed in one calendar year, this alternative lagging structure
yielded few changes relative to the basic data sample.
206 Conclusion
This paper exploits cross-country, cross-industry and intertemporal variation in manufacturing
employment and consumption growth to identify the relationship between economic weakness in
a foreign economy and the probability of antidumping protection. After controlling for other eco-
nomic and political variables including US GDP growth, I ﬁnd that a one standard deviation fall in
the growth of employment (consumption) in a foreign economy’s manufacturing industry doubles
(triples) the joint probability that the US industry will ﬁle an antidumping petition and the US
government will impose a preliminary (temporary) antidumping measure. Further, a one standard
deviation fall in foreign employment (consumption) growth increases the joint probability that a
petition will be ﬁled and a ﬁnal (long-lasting) antidumping measure will be imposed by a factor
of ﬁve (seven). While earlier research by Knetter and Prusa (2003) showed that antidumping pro-
tection is applied counter-cyclically with regard to the domestic business cycle, this paper provides
the ﬁrst evidence that I am aware of that US trade policy is applied counter-cyclically to foreign
economic ﬂuctuations.
































22Table 1: Accusations of dumping: US Manufacturing 1980-2001
Industry i makes accusation of dumping at t
Country j exports i to US at t and is...
accused of dumping 545
not accused 8017
Industry i makes no accusation of dumping at t
Country j exports i to US at t and is...
not accused 264,077
23Table 2: Cross-country variation in prelim. antidumping outcome: 1980-2001
No. of countries Number Aﬃrm. Negative Split
named in case of cases Cases Cases Cases
1 186 138 48 0
2 65 43 10 12
3 18 8 5 5
4 14 8 5 1
5 8 5 0 3
6 4 3 0 1
7 5 2 1 2
8 1 0 0 1
12 1 0 1 0
Total 302 207 70 25
24Table 3: Cross-country variation in ﬁnal antidumping outcome: 1980-2001
No. of countries Number Aﬃrm. Negative Split
named in case of cases Cases Cases Cases
1 186 80 106 0
2 65 28 25 12
3 18 7 6 5
4 14 5 4 4
5 8 4 2 2
6 4 2 1 1
7 5 0 4 1
8 1 0 1 0
12 1 0 1 0
Total 302 126 150 25
Table 4: 49 countries included in the dataset
Argentina Costa Rica Hungary Mexico Spain
Australia Denmark India Netherlands Sweden
Austria Ecuador Indonesia New Zealand Switzerland
Bangladesh Egypt Ireland Norway Taiwan
Belgium El Salvador Israel Peru Thailand
Brazil Finland Italy Philippines Trinidad
Canada France Japan Poland Turkey
Chile Germany Kenya Portugal U. Kingdom
China Greece South Korea Singapore Venezuela
Columbia Hong Kong Malaysia South Africa
25Table 5: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
Preliminary Measure= 1|petition ﬁled 0.739 0.439
Final Measure= 1|petition ﬁled 0.459 0.499
Petition Filed 0.0020 0.0447
Measures of foreign industry demand
Growth Foreign Employmentijt−1 0.003 0.195
Growth Foreign Consumptionijt−1 0.053 0.283
Growth Foreign Employijt−1 - Trendij 0.001 0.188
Growth Foreign Consumpijt−1 - Trendij 0.003 0.275
Measures of foreign market size
Ln Level of Foreign Employmentijt−1 10.572 1.703
Ln Level of Foreign Consumptionijt−1 14.867 1.778
Domestic Industry Variables
Growth US Employmentit−1 -0.014 0.095
Ln US Employmentit−1 3.202 1.031
Capacity Utilizationit−1 2.765 1.743
ValueAdded/Outputit−1 0.505 0.119
Foreign*Domestic Industry Variables
Growth Import Penetrationijt−1 0.088 1.118
Import Penetrationijt−1 0.006 0.026
Number of Observations 272639










as foreign demand 
shock
Detrended foreign  
consumption 
growth as foreign 
demand shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stage 1: Industry's filing decision
Measures of foreign demand
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1  !0.012*** !0.023***
(0.004) (0.004)
   Growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 !0.014**
(0.006)
   Detrended growth of foreign employment_ijt!1 !0.010**
(0.004)
   Detrended growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 !0.012**
(0.006)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
   Ln foreign consumption_ijt!1 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Stage 2: Government's preliminary decision
Measures of foreign demand 
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1     !0.038* !0.040
(0.023) (0.031)
   Growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 0.000
(0.015)
   Detrended growth of foreign employment_ijt!1 !0.042*
(0.022)
   Detrended growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 !0.003
(0.015)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
   Ln foreign consumption_ijt!1  0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Number of uncensored observations 545 443 441 545 443
Number of Observations 272639 228830 227849 272639 228830
Rho !0.025** !0.027* !0.029* !0.024** !0.027*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
Log Likelihood !3616.14 !2952.25 !2937.34 !3616.09 !2953.45
Notes: Huber!White robust std errors in parentheses with ***,**, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Other 
control variables in the stage 2:  government decision include: the growth of import penetration_ijt!1, the growth of domestic employment_it!1, 
capacity utilization_it!1, the growth of US GDP_t!1, and the bilateral real exchange rate between the dollar and country j's currency_t!1. Other 
control variables in the stage 1: Industry filing decision include all controls in the stage 2 decison plus import penetration_ijt!1, the logged level 
of domestic employment_it!1, and value added/output_it!1. 
27Table 7: Estimates of marginal eﬀects for preliminary decisions: Additional speciﬁcations
Restrict col. (1) sample to 
industries with 
antidumping filers
Restrict col. (1) 
sample 
to large exporters
Add a multi!country 
case dummy to basic 
specif. in col. (1)
(6) (7) (8)
Stage 1: Industry's filing decision
Measures of foreign demand
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1  !0.010*** !0.111*** !0.018***
(0.003) (0.034) (0.006)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.006*** 0.025*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Other control variables yes yes yes
Stage 2: Government's preliminary decision
Measures of foreign demand 
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1     !0.022 !0.361** !0.057*
(0.016) (0.183) (0.034)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.001 0.032 0.005
(0.002) (0.021) (0.004)
Other control variables yes yes yes
Number of uncensored observations 545 379 545
Number of Observations 82905 62850 272639
Rho !0.025** 0.034 !0.037**
(0.012) (0.196) (0.018)
Log Likelihood !3217.43 !2239.96 !3615.84
Notes: Huber!White robust std errors in parentheses with ***,**, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. Other control variables in the stage 2:  government decision include: the growth of import penetration_ijt!1, 
the growth of domestic employment_it!1, capacity utilization_it!1, the growth of US GDP_t!1, and the bilateral real 
exchange rate between the dollar and country j's currency_t!1. Other control variables in the stage 1: Industry filing 
decision include all controls in the stage 2 decison plus import penetration_ijt!1, the logged level of domestic 
employment_it!1, and value added/output_it!1.       
      
28Table 8: Predicted joint probability of a petition ﬁling and a preliminary antidumping measure for
a one s.d. fall in foreign demand
Spec.  Measure of foreign demand  Description 
Predicted joint probability of a 
filing and a preliminary 
measure conditional on a one 
std. dev. fall in foreign demand 
(1)  Employment growth  Basic specification  0.32% 
 
(2)  Consumption growth  Basic specification  0.44% 
 
(3)  Employment growth  Basic on spec . (2) sample  0.44% 
 
(4)  Detrended employ.  growth  Basic specification  0.29% 
 
(5)  Detrended  consump.  growth  Basic specification  0.39% 
 




(7)  Employment growth  Restrict spec. (1) sample  
to large exporters 
0.92% 
(8)  Employment growth  Add a multi!country case 
dummy to spec. (1) 
0.41% 
 























(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Stage 1: Industry's filing decision
Measures of foreign demand
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1  !0.048*** !0.059***
(0.017) (0.011)
   Growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 !0.046**
(0.019)
   Detrended growth of foreign employment_ijt!1 !0.045**
(0.019)
  Detrended growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 !0.039**
(0.02)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
   Ln foreign consumption_ijt!1 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Stage 2: Government's preliminary decision
Measures of foreign demand 
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1     0.017 0.033
(0.073) (0.063)
   Growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 0.036
(0.055)
   Detrended growth of foreign employment_ijt!1 !0.008
(0.077)
  Detrended growth of foreign consumption_ijt!1 0.027
(0.058)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.016 0.007 0.016*
(0.01) (0.008) (0.01)
   Ln foreign consumption_ijt!1  0.010 0.011
(0.012) (0.012)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Number of uncensored observations 545 443 441 545 443
Number of Observations 272639 228830 227849 272639 228830
Rho !0.095** !0.089* !0.084** !0.095** !0.090*
(0.042) (0.048) (0.035) (0.042) (0.048)
Log Likelihood !3678.159 !2987.146 !2973.175 !3678.728 !2988.404
Notes: Huber!White robust std errors in parentheses with ***,**, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Other control variables in the stage 2:  government decision include: the growth of import penetration_ijt!1, the growth of 
domestic employment_it!1, capacity utilization_it!1, the growth of US GDP_t!1, and the bilateral real exchange rate between the 
dollar and country j's currency_t!1. Other control variables in the stage 1: Industry filing decision include all controls in the stage 2 
decison plus import penetration_ijt!1, the logged level of domestic employment_it!1, and value added/output_it!1. 
30Table 10: Estimates of marginal eﬀects for ﬁnal decisions: Additional speciﬁcations
Restrict col. (9) sample to 
industries with 
antidumping filers
Restrict col. (9) 
sample 
to large exporters
Add a multi!country 
case dummy to basic 
specif. in col. (9)
(14) (15) (16)
Stage 1: Industry's filing decision
Measures of foreign demand
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1  !0.045*** !0.023*** !0.051***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.018)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.028*** 0.005*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Other control variables yes yes yes
Stage 2: Government's preliminary decision
Measures of foreign demand 
   Growth of foreign employment_ijt!1     0.021 0.017 0.017
(0.059) (0.026) (0.079)
Measures of foreign market size
   Ln foreign employment_ijt!1 0.008 0.004 0.019*
(0.009) (0.004) (0.011)
Other control variables yes yes yes
Number of uncensored observations 545 379 545
Number of Observations 82905 62850 272639
Rho !0.103** !0.061* !0.101**
(0.048) (0.033) (0.045)
Log Likelihood !3279.807 !2290.329 !3676.879
"Notes: Huber!White robust std errors in parentheses with ***,**, and * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. Other control variables in the stage 2:  government decision include: the growth of import penetration_ijt!
1, the growth of domestic employment_it!1, capacity utilization_it!1, the growth of US GDP_t!1, and the bilateral real 
exchange rate between the dollar and country j's currency_t!1. Other control variables in the stage 1: Industry filing 
decision include all controls in the stage 2 decison plus import penetration_ijt!1, the logged level of domestic 
employment_it!1, and value added/output_it!1.       
      
31Table 11: Predicted joint probability of a petition ﬁling and a ﬁnal antidumping measure for a one
s.d. fall in foreign demand
Spec.  Measure of foreign demand  Description 
Predicted joint probability of a 
filing and a final measure 
conditional on a one std. dev. 
fall in foreign demand 
(9)  Employment growth  Basic specification  0.52% 
 
(10)  Consumption growth  Basic specification  0.69% 
 
(11)  Employment growth  Basic on spec . (9) sample  0.56% 
 
(12)  Detrended employ.  growth  Basic specification  0.48% 
 
(13)  Detrended  consump.  growth  Basic specification  0.49% 
 




(15)  Employment growth  Restrict spec. (9) sample  
to large exporters 
0.45% 
(16)  Employment growth  Add a multi!country case 
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